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A man and a woman get married. After a number of years they have kids.
A few years later, they get a divorce. The divorce decree is issued in Israel,
where the wife resides, yet the ex-husband resides in Chicago.' The wife
obtains a claim for child support in Israel, and the husband, located in the
•
Juris Doctorate Candidate, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America,
2000; Candidate for Masters in International Affairs, Department of Politics, The Catholic University of
America, 2000; A.B., Bowdoin College, 1994. The author wishes to thank Prof. George E. Garvey, Professor
at the Columbus School of Law for his guidance and David Warner, Attorney at the Department of Justice,
Criminal Division, Office of International Affairs for his insight on this issue. Above all, the author thanks
Betty P. Atkins, for her patience, care, and love, and especially use of her dining room table. Prior to
publication, this paper was submitted in partial satisfaction ofdegree requirements at The Catholic University
of America.
I.
These are the facts of Nardi v. Segal, 234 N.E.2d 805 (Ill. 1968).
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United States, defaults on his child support payments. Can Illinois enforce the
claim for arrears based on the Israeli divorce decree, through a reciprocal
agreement with Israel? Or for that matter, can Chicago deal directly with
Haifa? Will an agreement between Illinois and Israel (or Chicago and Haifa)
hamper the United States' foreign relations with Israel on other issues?
This case and these issues illustrate the existence of a wide gap between
the need by the states to enforce international cases of child support violations
and the federal government's desire to have continued comity amongst fellow
nations. This gap has resulted in a federal statute allowing individual states to
enter into agreements with foreign nations. Although critics have argued that
some areas of international law have been promoted by state legislation,2 the
International Child Support Enforcement' (ICSE) provision of the Social
Security Act is merely a band-aid to an increasingly pervasive problem. The
crevice in which international child support cases exist, between the precipice
of state's control over family law issues on one side and the federal government's authority over foreign affairs on the other, has become wider as more
cases have fallen through the cracks and discussion has expanded on the issue."
In examining the issue of international child support enforcement, it is
necessary to notice the thin line between what is state and what is federal in
nature. Although enacted laws are presumed to be constitutional,' when the
democratic process produces a law, which goes against the Constitution, the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land must prevail.6
This paper examines the constitutionally of the recently promulgated
statutes 7 addressing the issue of international child support enforcement. It
provides an analysis of the various questions raised by the application of the
provisions upon the.scope of the state or local government's ability to enter in
the realm of foreign affairs. Section (I) briefly examines the articulated
purposes of the ICSE provisions and demonstrates that they are not consistent

2.
See Richard B. Bilder, The Rolde of States and Cities in ForeignRelations, 83 Am. J. Int't L.
821, 826, 828-830 (1989) [hereinafter Bilder].
3.
See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 654132(A), 659a (d) (West 1998). Throughout this paper I will collectively
refer to these two separate statutes as the ICSE provisions.
4.
See Adair Dyer, Internationalizationof Family Law, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 625, 641-645
(1997)[hereinafter Dyer];Peter H. Pfund, The DevelopingJurisprudenceof the Rights of the Child,3 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 665 (1997) [hereinafter Pfund]; Elizabeth Kolby, Moral Responsibility to Filipino
Amerasians: Potential Immigration and Child Support Alternatives, 2 ASIAN L. J. 61, 77-84 (1995)
[hereinafter Kolby]; Gloria F. DeHart, Comity, Conventions, and the Constitution: State and Federal
Initiativesin InternationalSupport Enforcement, 28 FAM. L. Q. 89 (1994)[hereinafter DeHart]; David F.
Cavers, InternationalEnforcement of Family Support, 81 COLUM. L REv. 994 (1981)[hereinafter Cavers].
5.
See Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466,475 (1883); see infra discussion section II.
6.
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2., "This Constitution .... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
7.
See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 654 132(A), 659a (d) (West 1998)(collectively referred to as the
International Child Support Enforcement provisions ICSE).
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with the actual language of the statute. Section (II) analyzes the constitutionality of the ICSE provisions' grant of extra-constitutional' powers to the
states. It will consider those clauses in the constitution which may give
Congress the authority to pass the ICSE provisions. Section (III) analyzes
Congress' ability to regulate family law. Finally, this paper proposes two
things. First, if the statute is valid, then international child support enforcement should be placed on a completely federal level without local interference
by the states into the federal government's foreign policy. Furthermore, if
Congress has Commerce Clause authority to regulate here, the provisions can
become constitutional without losing the desired effect by removing the
language directed toward the states from its content. Second, if Congress is
aggrandizing their power to regulate under the commerce clause then the life
span of the ICSE provisions is in serious jeopardy.
I. A STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF THE ICSE PROVISIONS
At common law, the only legal duty for a father to pay child support not
stipulated by contract, was a moral one.' In addition, if a minor child made a
contract with a third party, a father could not be held liable unless he explicitly
or implicitly consented to the contract.' 0 Current state statutes" and judicial
8.
Extra-constitutional powers, as referenced in this paper, means those powers which are not
specifically or residually granted to either the state or the federal government by the Constitution, i.e.
unconstitutional. The phrase extra-constitutional is amorphous in nature, equally being applied to mean
either non-constitutional, not stated in the constitution and thus political in nature, or unconstitutional, actions
which are against the expressed provisions in the Constitution. The phrase seemed appropriate in talking
about international child support enforcement, another amorphous area of the law.
9.
See Shelton v. Springett, II C.B. 452, 454-55, 138 Eng. Rep. 549, 550 (1851); Bazeley v.
Forder, 3 Q.B. 559, 561 (1868)("here is no obligation on the part of the father to support his children at the
common law, the liability is only by force of the statutes as to poor law"). Id.
10. See Shelton, 11 C.B. at 454-455; see also id. at 456 (Maule, J.concurrence). "[Tihe mere moral
obligation on the father to maintain his child affords no inference of a legal promise to pay his debts." Id.
11.
ANN. CAL. CIr. CODE § 4700 (Supp. 1980); Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act §§ 2,3,
9 U.L.A. 174, 177 (1979). Some states have extended the duty of support to stepparents. See, e.g., N.H.
STAT. ANN. §§ 546-A:1, 546-A:2 (1974); N.Y.-MCKINNEY'SSOC. SERV. L. § 101 (1983 &Supp. 1986); S.D.
COMP. L. §25-7-8 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. 1986, § 78-45-4.1 (Supp.); WEST'S REV. CODE WASH. ANN.
§ 26.16.205 (Supp. 1986).; See generally Logan v.Logan, 424 A.2d 403 (N.H. 1980). Note however, in the
absence of statutory imposed duty, in common law stepparents have no duty of support for their stepchildren
unless the stepparent assumes such a duty. See Chapin v. Superior Court In and For Kern County, 239 Cal.
App.2d 851 (1966); Ladd v.Welfare Commissioner, 217 A.2d 490 (1965); Fussell v. Douberly, 206 So.2d
231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Zeller v. Zeller, 407 P.2d 478 (Kan. 1965); In re Besondy, 20 N.W. 366
(Minn. 1884); Falzo v. Falzo, 202 A.2d 192 (N.J. Super 1964); In re Estate of Turer, 133 N.W.2d 765 (Wis.
1965); In re Fowler, 288 A.2d 463 (Vt. 1972).
Thus, a stepparent can relinquish their duty at any time without an imposition of liability. See Franklin
v. Franklin, 253 P.2d 337 (1953); Clevenger v. Clevenger 189 Cal. App.2d 658 (1961); Remliewicz v.
Remkiewicz, 429 A.2d 833 (Conn. 1980); Brown v. Brown, 412 A.2d 396 (Md. 1980); Chestnut v.Chestnut,
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decisions 2 have placed a duty on both parents to be responsible for the support
of their children. 3
When this duty is breached, children and custodial guardians often look
to the courts for relief. Remedies which are available to children for the
enforcement of the duty of support include bringing a civil suit against the
offending parent,"' encouraging the state to bring a criminal suit, 5 or bringing6
a suit in equity for the purchase of essential items for the child's maintenance.'
Judgment by the court is often times the awarding of specific performance of
child support payments. If it is determined that the parent intentionally refused
to pay, and payment was economically feasible, penalties for non-compliance
include civil contempt, 7 criminal sanctions, 8 and if the non-custodial parent
is a federal employee, the garnishment of wages.' 9
Child support enforcement has traditionally been the domain of the state
govemment. 20 However, when the problem of interstate enforcement of child
support orders became too pervasive to be ignored, National Conference of

Commission on Uniform Laws approved a series of uniform acts,2' Revised

147 S.E.2d 269 (S.C. 1966). See generallyMahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child
Relationship,70 CORN. L REV. 38 (1984).
12.
Barnhard v. Barnhard, 252 At. 167,477 S.W.2d 845 (1972); Carter v. Carter, 397 N.Y.S.2d
88 (2nd Dept. 1977); Murredu v. Murredu, 236 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va. 1977).
13.
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1,
also requires both parents to share the responsibility of child support. See generally Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979) holding that a statute authorizing alimony only to wives and not husbands violated the Equal
Protection Clause.
14.
McQuade v. McQuade, 358 P.2d 470 (Colo. 1960); Johnson v. Norman 421 N.E.2d 124 (Ohio
1981).
15.
State v. Ducey, 266 N.E.2d 233 (Ohio 1970).
16.
Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1953).
17.
Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An Empirical Study ofEstablishment and
Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the Denver District Court, 57 DEN. L. 1.21, 44 (1979).
18.
See Day v. State, 481 P.2d 807 (Okl. Crim. App. 1971) (non-support of child is a continuing
criminal offense); see generally THE MODEL PENALCODE § 207.14 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (misdemeanor
to fail to support a child, when defendant is capable of payment).
19.
42 U.S.C.A. §659. The use of garnishment are limited in scope. See Brockelman v.
Brockelman, 478 F. Supp. 141 (D.Kan. 1979) (spouse may not garnish amounts owed to the other spouse as
income tax refunds). See generally Maj. Alan Cook, The Armed Forces as a Model Employer in Child
Support Enforcement: A Proposal to Improve Service of Process on Military Members, 155 MIL. L. REV.
153, 161 (1998) (arguing that the military seems to be more effective enforcer of child support claims than
the local or state governments).
20.
Kolby supra note 4. at 77. See also Gloria F. DeHart, Getting Support Over There, 9 FAM.
ADVOC. 34 (1987).
21.
See Faye R. Goldberg, Child Support Enforcement; Balancing Increased Federal Involvement
with Procedural Due Process, 19 SuFrOLK U. L REV. 687 (1985) (presenting a history of the federal
government involvement in child support issues); see also Kolby supra note 4, at 78.
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Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA)22 and the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), 3 for the states to adopt, and which
currently have been enacted in some form in all states.24 Under these laws,
interstate child support enforcement decrees are treated like any other sisterstate court orders, thus making enforcement
possible under the Full Faith and
25
Credit Clause of the Constitution.

22.
9 U.L.A. 381 §2(m)(1987). Avast majority ofstates have repealed the reciprocal enforcement
act in favoring instead to adopt the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), 9. U.LA. 15 § 1(19)
(Supp. 1993).
23.
9 U.LA. 15 § 1(19) (Supp. 1993).
24.
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1996), replacing the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act, has been adopted by forty-nine states and the District of Columbia. ALA. CODE §§ 30-3a101 to 30-3a-906 (1998); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.25.101 to 25.25.903 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25621 to 25-661; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-17-101 to 9-17-902 (Michie 1998); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 490 to 4976;
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5-101 to 14-5-1007; 1997 CONN. ACMS 97-1 (2nd Spec. Sess.); DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 601 to691 (1998); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-341.1 to 30-349.1 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
88.0011 to 88.9051 (West 1998); GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 19-11-100 to 19-11-191 (Michie 1998); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 576B-101 to 576B-902 (1998); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-1001 to 7-1059 (1998); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 22/100 to 22/999 (West 1998); IND. CODE. ANN. §§ 31-18-1-1 to 31-18-9-4 (West 1998); IOWACODE
ANN. §§ 252K.101 to 252K.904 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-9,301 to 23-9,903 (1998); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 407.5101 to 407.5902 (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301.1 to 1308.2 (West 1998);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 2801 to 3401; MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 10-301 to 10-359 (1998);
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 209D, §§ 1-101 to 9-902 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 552.1101
to 552.1901 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518C.101 to 518C.902 (West 1998); Miss. CODE. ANN. §§
93-25-1 to 93-25-117 (1998); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 454.850 to 454.997 (West 1998); MONT. CODE. ANN. §§
40-5-101 to 40-5-197 (1998); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-701 to 42-751 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 130.0902
to 130.802 (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 546-B:1 to 546-B:60 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-6A-101
to 40-6A-903 (Michie 1998); N.Y. FAm. Cr. Act. §§ 580-101 to 580-905 (1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§52C-1 100 to 52C-9-902 (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-12.2-01 to 14-12.2-49 (1998); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN.
§§ 3115.01 to 3115.59 (West 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 601-100 to 601-901 (1998); OR. REV.
STAT. §§110.300 to 110.441 (1998); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7101 to 7901 (West 1998); R.1. GEN.
LAWS §§ 15-23-I to 15-23-53 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-960 to 20-7-1166 (Law. Co-op. 1998); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-9B-101 to 25-9B-902 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 36-5-2001 to 36-5-2902
(1998); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 159.001 to 159.902; (West 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45f-200 to 7845f-901 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15B, §§ 101 to 904 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-88.32 to 20-88.82
(Michie 1998); WASH. REV. CODEANN. §§ 26.21.005 to26.21.916 (West 1998); W.VA. CODE §§ 48B-1 -101
to 48B-9-903 (1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 769.101 to 769.903 (West 1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-4-139
to 20-4-189 (Michie 1998).
A few states have enacted the UIFSA, but have not repealed their Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act statutes: Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-11-40 to 19-11-81 (1998); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 252A. Ito 252A.25 (West 1998); and Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.151 to 780.183 (West
1998). Kentucky's adoption statute of the UIFSA, and repeal of the RURESA, would be deemed effective
when the United States Congress requires the UIFSA be adopted by the several states. See KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 407.5101 to 407.5902 (Michie 1998).
New Jersey is the only state which has not adopted the Uniform Family Support Act, but kept their
URESA statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:4-30.24 to 2A:4-30.64 (West 1998).
25.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State." All United States' states must give the same effect
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A problem arises when discussing the enforcement of foreign child support
decrees. Unlike in the interstate model of child support enforcement full faith
and credit does not apply to foreign judgments,2 6 states are not allowed to make
treaties with foreign nations,27 and enforcement of foreign court orders is by the
discretion of the state court28 or through a reciprocal arrangement between the

to a judgment of a court of a sister-state as if the judgment was rendered in the requesting state's court, as
long as the judgment was final and the court who entered the order had valid jurisdiction over the case.

26. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not imply that the state
court must recognize decisions from foreign nations just sister-states of the United States.
In Nardi v. Segal, 234 N.E.2d 805 (111. 1968), an ex-wife brought a suit for arrearages of child support
against her ex-husband. ld at 806. The child support enforcement decree was based on an Israeli divorce
decree. Id. At the time the complaint was filed, the wife was living in Israel, the ex-husband in Chicago, and
the ex-husband had not paid nine months of child support. Id. The court stated that the doctrine of comity
did not require it to enforce a decree from a foreign country, nor did the Full-Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution require the court to recognize or enforce a decree from a foreign country. But see
Wolff v.Wolff, 389 A.2d 413, (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978), where the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held
that the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act did not preclude the state court from
recognizing or enforcing an alimony decree obtained in England. Thus recognition of the foreign order by
the state court is not based on whether the court had jurisdiction but on the doctrine of comity.
Recognition of a foreign judgment does not imply enforcement of the judgment. The Uniform
Foreign-Money Judgment Recognition Act (UFMJRA) excludes judgments for "support in matrimonial or
family matters" from its definition of "foreign judgments." Uniform Foreign-Money Judgment Recognition
Act §1(2); See also 100 A.L.R.3d 792 (explaining the construction and application of the Uniform ForeignMoney Judgment Recognition Act).
By legislative promulgation, twenty-eight states, Washington, DC and the Virgin Islands have adopted
the UFMJRA. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.30.100 to 09.30.180 (Michie 1998); CAL.CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1713
to 1713.8 (West 1998); COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-16-101 to 13-62-109 (West 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 50a-30 to 50a-38 (West 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4801 to 4808 (1998); D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 15-381 to 15-388 (West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 55.601 to 55.607 (West 1998); GA. CODE ANN. §§
9-12-110 to 9-12-117 (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658C-1 to 685C-9 (1998); IDAHO CODE §§ 10-1401 to
10-1409 (1998); 735 ILL.COMP.STAT. ANN. 5/12-618 to 5/12-626 (West 1998); IOWACODEANN. §§ 626B. I
to 626B.8 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., CS. &JUD. PROC §§ 10-701 to 10-709 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 235, § 23A (West 1998); MICH.COMP. LAwS ANN. §§ 691.1151 to 691.1159 (West 1998); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 548.35 (West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 511.770 to 511.787 (West 1998); MONT. CODE. ANN.
§§ 25-9-601 to 25-9-609 (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:49A-16 to 2A:49A-24 (West 1998); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 39-4B-1 to 39-4B-9 (Michie 1998); N.Y.C.P.L.R. 5301 to5309 (McKinney 1998); N.C.GEN. STAT.
§§ 1C-1800 to IC-1808 (1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.90 to 2394.94 (Anderson 1998); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit 12, §§ 710 to 718 (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 24.200 to 24.255 (1998); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 22001 to 22009 (1998); TEX. Cwv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001 to 36.008, 36.0041 to
36.0044 (West 1998); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-465.6 to 8.01-465.13 (Michie 1998); WASH. REV. CODE.
ANN. §§ 6.40.010 to 6.40.915 (West 1998); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 561 to 569 (1998).
By adopting the UFMJRA, state courts are precluded from recognizing and enforcing child support
decrees from foreign countries. See generally Nardi, 234 N.E.2d at 805; Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 360
1977).
N.E.2d 386 (111.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10.
28. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (stating that it is the state's courts discretion whether
to recognize a foreign nation's court judgment since under the principle of comity of nations the state court
was under no obligation).
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A.

The Statutory Language of the ICSE Provisions

Legislation is presumed constitutional, unless sufficient evidence is
presented to rebut the presumption.30 The Supreme Court has held that when
a statute contains patent inconsistencies against the expressed provisions of the
federal constitution, it is facially invalid.3 There is case law in which a facially
neutral statute, when applied, posed latent inconsistencies with federal law.32
Such statutes are also invalid.33 If a statute contains possible inconsistencies,
the legislature should ensure that the language of the statute clearly reflects a
valid legislative intent. If the statute is invalid when applied, the legislature
should repeal such an ineffective statute.
The International Child Support Enforcement (ICSE) 35 provisions are
comprised of two statutory acts. The first one, under 42 U.S.C.A. §659a, is
entitled International Support Enforcement.36 The second provision, also
29. Pfund, at 674-75; Kolby, at 78; Cavers, at 1037 (stating that in absence of federal exercising
any power in enforcing international child support decrees, the states have in increasing number entered into
reciprocity arrangement with foreign nations).
Any future reference to foreign governments or foreign states means government of nation states and
not the government of the states of the United States.
30. See Close v.Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466,475 (1883); Sloan v.Baker, 10 P.2d 362,364
(Or. 1932). This presumption is asserted to prevent the courts from rewriting the Constitution to adapt the
document to present life. Instead, the presumption gives force to newly enacted laws, at the same time not
disrupting the actual language of the Constitution. Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 410 (1920)(J.
Clarke, dissenting).

But see Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L REv. 457, 469 "It is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the ground upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past." Id.
31.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The
Supremacy Clause dictates that no other law shall be above the federal Constitution. "This Constitution...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST.art. VI, cl.
2. State laws and state constitutions can give
a broader interpretation of a constitutional right, but not a narrower one.
32. See E.E.O.C. v. Illinois, 69 F.3d 167, 170-171 (1995).
33.

See id.

34. In United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), prior to the Supreme Court deciding the
matter, Congress had adopted an amendment to the statute at issue in order, so that it may reflect a legislative
history which included an explanation on the connection between the impact of the regulation of gun
possession on school grounds and interstate commerce.
35. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 654 132(A), 659a (d) (West 1998).
36. "(a) Authority for declarations
(1) Declarations

The Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, is authorized to declare any foreign country (or a political subdivision
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incorporated under the federal Social Security Act, regulates state plans for
child and spousal support, under 42 U.S.C.A. §654. 37
The current practice among state governments has been to enter into
agreements with foreign nations to address the issue of international child
support enforcement.3" The ICSE provisions39 of the federal Social Security
Act makes reference to the current arrangement between states and foreign
nations,' while simultaneously granting authority to the State Department and
thereof) to be a foreign reciprocating country if the foreign country has established, or
undertakes to establish, procedures for the establishment and enforcement of duties of
support owed to obligees who are residents of the United States, and such procedures
are substantially in conformity with the standards prescribed under section (b) of this

section.
(3)
Form of declaration
A declaration under paragraph (1) may be made in the form of an international
agreement, in connection with an international agreement or corresponding foreign
declaration, or on a unilateral basis.
(b)

Standards for foreign support enforcement procedures

(2)
Additional elements
The Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the States, may establish such additional standards as may be
considered necessary to further the process of this section.
(d) , Effects on other states
States may enter into reciprocal arrangements for the establishment and enforcement
of support obligations with foreign countries that are not the subject of a declaration
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, to the extent consistent with Federal law."
37.
"A State plan for child and spousal support must32 (A) provide that any request for services under this part by a foreign reciprocating
country or a foreign country with which the States has an arrangement described in
section (42 U.S.C.S. §659a(d)] shall be treated as a request by a state;
(B) provide, at State option, notwithstanding ...any other provision of this
(act], for services under the plan for enforcement of a spousal support order not
described in paragraph (4)(B) entered by such a country (or subdivision); and
(C) provide that no application will be required from, and no costs will assessed
for such services against, the foreign reciprocating country or foreign obligee (but
costs may at State option be assessed against the obligor)."
38.
See supra note 3.
39.
See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 654 132(A), 659a (d) (West 1998).
40. See id. The language in subsection (d), entitled "Effect on other laws" gives the states the
authority to enter into reciprocal enforcement agreements with foreign nations as long as the country is not
one already declared by the State Department to be a reciprocating nation under subsection (a) or inconsistent
with federal law. Id. at (d).
The current practice of international child support enforcement has been through Parallel Unilateral
Policy Declarations (PUPDs). Under the PUPDs, and the principle of comity, the state, through its courts
would agree to recognize foreign child support decrees if the foreign nation would reciprocate and afford the
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the Department of Health and Human Services to designate foreign nations as
reciprocating countries who will honor the United States child support decree.4
It also creates an imposition upon the state courts to recognize and treat foreign
judgments for child support as if it originated from a sister-state.42 In enacting
the ICSE provisions, Congress sought to federalize the issue of international
child support enforcement4 3 by encouraging the federal government to take a
more active role in enforcement."
The ICSE provisions, in various
incarnations, were debated and dissected in Congress for over two years before
being signed into law.45
state citizens the same opportunity for enforcement of United States child support decrees. Some have argued
that with the passage of the ICSE provisions the federal government will be more inclined to begin
negotiations with foreign countries, both past participants in the PUPDs and other nations, regarding child
support enforcement. See DeHart, at 89.
41.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 659a (a) (West 1998).
42. See 42 U.S.C.A. at § 654. Section 654 entitled, "State plan for child and spousal support"
requires that any state plan for child support enforcement must treat international child support claims as if
there are interstate child support claims. See id at I 32(A).
Child support enforcement has traditionally been the domain of the state government. See Kolby, at
77. See also Gloria F. DeHart, Getting Support Over There, 9 F~m. ADVOC. 34 (1987). However, when the
problem of interstate enforcement of child support orders became too pervasive to be ignored, the National
Conference of Commission on Uniform Laws passed a series of uniform acts, Revised Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), 9 U.L.A. 381 § 2(m) (1998), and the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act (UIFSA), 9 U.L.A. 15 § 1(19) (1998), for the states to adopt, and which currently have been
enacted in some form in 49 states and the District of Columbia. See discussion following note 24.
Under state laws interstate child support enforcement decrees are treated like any other sister-state
court decrees, thus enforcement is possible under the principles of Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV,§ 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State." All United States' state courts must give the
same effect to a judgment of a court of a sister-state as if the judgment was rendered in the requesting state's
court, as long as the judgment was final and the court that entered the order had valid jurisdiction over the
case.

Under the principles of full faith and credit, and comity of nations, state courts are allowed to
recognize foreign court judgments at their discretion. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). However,
recognition does not imply that the judgment is considered conclusive evidence of an obligation to pay, just
prima facie evidence that a debt exists. Id.
43. See P.L. 104-193 § 39. "The U.S. and selected foreign nations maybe able to help each other
deal with the problem of parents and former spouses crossing boundaries to avoid support payments." Id.
. The United States is not a signatory to any of the United Nations treaties pertaining to international
child support enforcement. Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance Obligations, June 20, 1956,
268 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance
Obligations, Oct. 2, 1973, 1021 U.N.T.S. 209; see also 136 Cong. Rec. E2904 (daily ed. Sept. 19,
1990)(statement of Rep. Kennelly).
Prior to the passage of the ICSE provisions, no law existed on the issue of international child support
enforcement. 141 Cong. Rec. H12317, H15427 (daily ed. December 21, 1995); P.L. 104-193 § 39.
44. See P.L. 104-193 § 39 International Child Support Enforcement. The provisions were to "allow
and encourage the Secretary of State to pursue reciprocal support agreements with other nations." Id.
45. Representative Kennelly introduced legislation of January 4, 1995, designed to improve
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Congress expressed four specific reasons for passing the ICSE provisions:
(1) to provide a remedy to U.S. parents in the enforcement of child support
abroad,' (2) to address the fact that states do not have the power to enter into
treaties, (3) to encourage the Department of State to take a more active role in
pursuing agreements with foreign nations on this issue, and (4) to place on a
federal level the issue of international child support 7enforcement in order to
cultivate solutions to the problem via foreign policy.
Whether the statute provides an adequate remedy to U.S. parents trying to
enforce child support claims abroad remains a pressing issue- since its
enactment. 48 The statute fails to provide any expressed jurisdictional predicate,
stating which forum or choice of law the parents will utilize.4 9 The statute does
declare that a request by a reciprocating foreign nation should be treated as if
it were a request by a sister state. 50 Yet, unlike international requests, interstate
requests have the protection of both state and federal law.
Each state has adopted into their laws provisions allowing for recognition
of outside state claims, thus ensuring interstate requests receive the same
treatment as intrastate requests for assistance. Additionally, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution precludes the courts of one state from
discriminating against and not recognizing judgments from another state.
Comparatively, international child support embodies two distinct principles of

interstate enforcement by urging Congress to ratify the U.N. treaties on international child support
enforcement and thus treat international support claims as if they were interstate support claims. See H.R.
95, 104th Cong. § 424 (1995). Senator Bradley introduced similar legislation on February 16, 1995. See S.
456, 104th Cong. §172 (1995); see also S. 442, 104th Cong. § 172 (1995)
Also on January 4, 1995, the clauses pertaining to state authority to enter into agreements with other
nations were introduced as part of the proposed Balance Budget Act, HR 2491, 104th Cong. § 12370 (1995),
and the proposed Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995, HR 4, 104th Cong. §371
(1995). It was not until October 23, 1995, did the Senate propose similar legislation, but only pertaining to
the power of the State Department to designate foreign nations. S. 1357, 104th Cong. § 7371 (1995). The
legislation was re-introduced by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, in its entirety on June 5, 1996. See S. 1841,
104th Cong. § 271 (1996).
46.
Currently, the United States is not a signatory to any major treaty or international convention
regarding international child support. The current reciprocal agreements by the states with foreign countries
were done pursuant to the model established in the URESA.
47.
H.R. Rep. No. 104-430, at 44 (1995); H.R. Rep. No. 104-350, at 44 (1995); P.L. 104-193, Title
111,§39; 141 Cong. Rec. H15317-01, H15427 (1995); 141 H12509-01 (Pt. 2), H12976 (1995).
48.
See Pfund at 665, 675 (citing the ICSE provision, 42 U.S.C. §659a, as a new remedy for the
problem of international enforcement.); Dehart, at 93-4 (explaining the system between the state and foreign
governments in enforcing international orders under the URESA system); See also Cavers, at 997-1000
(addressing the issue of enforcing claims in the United States and abroad prior to the passage of the ICSE
provisions).
49.
See Carol S. Bruch, Statutory Reform of ConstitutionalDoctrine: Fitting InternationalShoe
to Family Law, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1047,1049 (1995).
50.
42 U.S.C. §654 32 (A).
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law: family law and international affairs. Family law has traditionally been the
domain of state government and state courts."' Early on, the Supreme Court
found federal courts lack the necessary judicial expertise in domestic issues and
state courts were the best forum to handle such delicate matters.52 Additionally,
recognition of foreign court judgments are not automatic, but instead are based
solely on the discretion of the court to recognize the claim of an international
court judgment.5 3 Unlike Full Faith and Credit recognition, the recognition by
the court is not conclusive evidence that child support is due, but merely
evidence that a debt is owed to the complaining party.54 Therefore,
international claims can not be treated similar to interstate claims because of the
broad judicial discretion by the state courts to accept or deny recognition of a
foreign judgments."
The language of the statute is not directed towards state courts, but to state
governments. The statute expresses that "states may enter into reciprocal
arrangements for the establishment and enforcement of support obligations with
foreign countries."5 6 Identifying the constitutional basis for how a federal
statute may effect interstate commerce may aid in interpreting the legislative
intent if the law is on questionable grounds.5 7 A state court can hear a case
arising under federal law unless Congress says otherwise. 8 State courts have
inherent authority and are presumably competent to adjudicate claims arising
under the laws of the United States.59 This presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction can be rebutted by explicit statutory language or unmistakable
implication from legislative history or clear incompatibility between state court
jurisdiction and federal interest.' Federal question jurisdiction in district
courts dictates that federal courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions

51.
Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 590-92 (1858)(holding that matters dealing with domestic
relations are to be handled by the state courts, not the federal courts, since there exist no history of family law
on the federal level).
52.
Id.
53.
supra the discussion following note 46.
54.
Id.
55.
Although URESA was enacted to facilitate interstate child support enforcement, only about 41%
of state courts actually enforce claims from other states. 138 Cong. Rec. H7326 (statement by Rep. Hyde).
56.
42 U.S.C.A. §659a (d) (West 1998).
57.
Id.
58.
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 380-81 (1990).
59.
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-9 (1990).
60.
Id. See also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10; id. at art. 11,§2; id. at amend. X. See generally Printz v.
U.S., 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995)(Kennedy's concurrence); N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992)(holding that Congress' efforts to
mandate state toxic waste clean up violated the Tenth Amendment); Missouri v. Holland, 40 S.Ct. 382
(1920); Condon v. Reno, 155 F. 3d 453 (1998).
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arising under the Constitution,6 ' federal laws or treaties of the United States.62
The ICSE provisions are silent as to the jurisdictional predicate to be employed
in bringing claims under this statute. Therefore, the statute does not explicitly
rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction.
B.

Legislative History of the ICSE Provisions

The legislative history of the ICSE provision gives jurisdiction by
implication to the federal court over the issue of international child support
enforcement. 63 By claiming to provide a remedy to United States parents in the
enforcement of child support abroad, the language in the ICSE provisions is
designed to allow the states to continue making arrangements with foreign
nations.' If the statute had vested jurisdiction in both state and federal courts,
the legislative history would not have mentioned that states can not enter into
treaties with foreign nations.6 5 In addition, allowing states to enter into these
agreements does not provide a direct remedy to parents who want to enforce
international claims for child support. Even if such agreements are legal, by not
providing a jurisdictional predicate within the statute itself, parents are not
afforded adequate remedies to enforce child support claims abroad.
The congressional record and debates indicate that the legislature
envisioned a more efficient enforcement of international child support claims.'
The legislative history of ICSE provisions acknowledges that states can not
make treaties.67 In addition, one purpose of the statute was to authorize and
motivate the federal government to take action in the area of child support since
the United States has not signed any treaties regarding this issue. 68 Further-

See 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1998). Original jurisdiction in this context means non-appellate
61.
jurisdiction. See also 28 U.S.C. § 125 1(b) (1998) (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have original but
not exlusive jurisdiction of: (1) All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties;... (3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the
citizens of another States or against aliens").
28 U.S.C. §1331 (1998).
62.
See Pfund, at 674-675; See also DeHart, at 110 (calling for Federal government involvement
63.
in international child support cases).
64.
42 U.S.C.A. §659a (d) (West 1998).
See infra the discussion regarding the prohibition on states forming treaties with foreign
65.
nations.
See 136 Cong. Rec. E2904-01 (1990)(Rep. Kennelly calling for a ratification by the United
66.
States of the international treaties dealing with child support enforcement); See also 141 Cong. Rec. H358107, H3662 (1995) (proposing the adoption of the United Nations Convention of 1956, the so called "New
York" Convention, pertaining to international child support enforcement).
H.R. Rep. No. 104-430, at 44 (1995); H.R. Rep. No. 104-350, at 44 (1995); P.L. 104-193, Title
67.
111,§39; 141 Cong. Rec. H15317-01, H15427 (1995); 141 H12509-01 (Pt. 2), H12976 (1995).
P.L. 104-193, Title iIl, §39.
68.
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more, the legislative history articulates that international child support
enforcement claims should be treated like inter-state claims.69
C.

Statutory Analysis of the ICSE Provisions

Nothing in the statutory language or history intimates that the legislature
contemplated a non-custodial parent ever bringing a claim against the execution
of the order, under the provisions, as being unconstitutional or outside the scope
of the state's authority. 0 The specific language of the ICSE provisions, create
three functions. First, the provisions can be interpreted as an enabling statute,
giving the federal government the right to act on the states behalf.7 Second, it
is a supplementary statute, giving the states the right to make arrangements with
foreign nations in the absence of the federal government action.72 Finally, the
provisions act as a regulatory statute, requiring the states to give similar
treatment to international child support claims as they would to inter-state
claims.73 Allowing states to contract with foreign nations contradicts the grant
of jurisdiction to federal, rather than state courts.
The legislative history does not explicitly illustrate whether it was the
intention of the legislature to give both the federal and state governments
concurrentjurisdiction in the field of international child support enforcement.74
69.
See supra the discussion following notes 44-48.
70.
P.L. 104-193, Title ill §39; H.R. 3857, 104th Cong. §§ 41712,42424 (1996); H.R. 3832, 104th
Cong. § 3832 (1996); S. 1867, 104th Cong. § 371 (1996); H.R. 3612, 104th Cong. § 271 (1996); S. 1841,
104th Cong. § 271 (1996); H.R. 3453, 104th Cong. § 171 (1996); H.R. 3266, 104th Cong. § 371 (1996);
H.R. 2915, 104th Cong. § 971 (1996); H.R. Rep. No. 104-725 at 41 (1996); H.R. 2491,104th Cong. § 12370
(1995); H.R. 2491,104th Cong. § 7371 (1995); H.R. 2530, 104th Cong. § 9472 (1995); S.1357, 104th Cong.
§ 7371 (1995); H.R. 4,104th Cong. § 971 (1995); S.1117, 104th Cong. § 572 (1995); S. 840, 104th Cong.
§ 472 (1995); H.R. 1267, 104th Cong. § 472 (1995); H.R. 1250, 104th Cong. § 372 (1995); S.442, 104th
Cong. § 172 (1995); S. 456, 104th Cong. § 172 (1995); H.R. 785, 104th Cong. §172 (1995); H.R. 95, 104th
Cong. § 424 (1995); H.R. 2491, 104th Cong. § 12370 (1995); H.R. 4,10th Cong. § 371 (1995); H.R. Rep.
No. 104-430 at 371 (1995); H.R. Rep. No. 104-430 at 44 (1995); H.R. Rep. No. 104-350 at 12370 (1995);
H.R. Rep. No. 104-350 at 44 (1995); 142 Cong. Rec. H8829-02, H8925 (1996); 142 Cong. Rec. H7907-04,
H7947 (1996); 142 Cong. Rec. S8226-01, S8226(1996); 142 Cong. Rec. H15317-01, H15351 (1995); 141
Cong. Rec. H15317-01, H15427 (1995); 141 Cong. Rec. H13379-01, H13589 (1995); 141 Cong. Rec.
H12509-01 (Pt. 1),H12720(1995); 141 Cong.Rec.S16159-01,S16284(1995); 141Cong.Rec.S15852-01,
S15945 (1995); 141 Cong.Rec. H10995-01,HI1312(1995); 141 Cong.Rec. S12428-02,S12501 (1995);
141 Cong. Rec. S12968-01, S13020 (1995); 141 Cong. Rec. S11894-01, S11922 (1995); 141 Cong. Rec.
S11640-01, S11707 (1995); 141 Cong.Rec. H3742-04, H3759 (1995); 141 Cong. Rec. H3581-07,H3662
(1995); 141 Cong. Rec. S2823-02, S2886 (1995); 140 Cong. Rec. S14479-02, S14522 (1994).
71.
See 42 U.S.C.A. §659a(a) (West 1998).
72.
Id. at §659a(d).
73. Id. §654(32); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-430, at 44 (1995); H.R. Rep. No. 104-350, at 44
(1995); P.L. 104-193, Title 111,§39; 141 Cong. Rec. H15317-01, H15427 (1995); 141 H12509-01 (Pt. 2),
H12976 (1995).
74.
See supra discussion following notes 44-48.
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Yet, the statutory history, by implication, gives federal question jurisdiction
over international child support enforcement to the federal courts.75 Although
child support is best settled in state courts, the international nature of the statute
indicates that Congress envisioned the federal government and its courts
controlling the issue.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE ICSE PROVISIONS

The structure of the Constitution creates a dual sovereignty, where by the
federal and state governments are both vested with and limited by certain
powers. 7' The federal government is one of enumerated powers whose
authority is defined by the Constitution.7 7 All residual power, not expressly
78
denied by the Constitution, is vested in the state government and the people.
Analyzing the federal government's authority possesses within the Constitution
has been twofold, formalistic and functionalistic. A formalistic view of the
United States Constitution asserts that if the constitution does not expressly
grant the federal government the authority to act, it implicitly forbids.7 9 A
functionalistic view of the Constitution states that what the Constitution does
not expressly prohibit or limit, it implicitly permits.'o There are many articles
which suggest that international child support enforcement should be viewed
under a functionalistic test. 8' Although the court seems to apply both
approaches, 8 2 more recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated a trend towards utilizing a formalistic analysis to federalism questions.83 Following the
modem trend of the court, the paper analyzes Congress' authority to enact the
ICSE provisions under a formalistic microscope.
Under the Constitution, full authority over foreign affairs is given to the
federal government.84 The Constitution expressly prohibits those activities by
75.

Id.

76.

U.S. CONST. et. seq.

Id. at art. I, et. seq.
77.
78.
Id. at amend. X.
79.
Harold H. Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?, I 11HARv. L. REv. 1824, 1846-1848
(1998)[hereinafter Koh].
80. Id.
81.
See DeHart, at 108-109; Pfund, at 765.
82.
Cf. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1987); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 471 U.S. 1049 (1984) with Printz .v United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). See also Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453,461-63 (4th Cir. 1998)(following
the Printz decision, stating that the federal government can not single out states to implement federal policy).
83.
Id.
84.
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 649, 665-66 (1840); See also Bilder, at 821-3 (presenting the
current trend of state and local governments entering in the arena of foreign policy from "sister-city"
programs to direct economic agreements to declarations of being nuclear-free zones). Bilder laments that
despite the apparent intrusion of states and local governments into foreign policy making ventures, neither
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state and local governments which invade the realm of expressed powers given
to the federal government,"5 including negotiating with foreign nations on
matters of foreign affairs.86 Congress may have the power to authorize state and
local governments to participate in activities which would ordinarily invade in
the realm of the federal government's control of foreign affairs,87 however a
grant of such power is inconsistent with the Constitution's delegation of
exclusive power of foreign policy to the President and Congress.88 Thus the
express language of the Constitution answers the question of what limits the
constitution places on the state government89 and who has the ultimate power
in matters of foreign affairs.' Therefore, "any judgments as to what constitutes
appropriate state or local involvement in foreign affairs ought to be made
primarily by the political branches, in which the federal foreign relations power
is lodged."'"
A.

Treaty Making and State Treaty ProhibitingClauses

Every word within the Constitution is significant and has meaning.9" The
Supreme Court has defined a treaty as "an instrument written and executed with
the formalities customary among nations."93 Under the Constitution, the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, holds the exclusive power
to make treaties.9 The Constitution neither grants a similar concurrent power
in the legislative,95 nor in the judicial branch of the federal government.96 In
addition, the Constitution explicitly prohibits the state governments from

Congress nor the Executive branch has hastened to react to the current situation. Id. See generally United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,331 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,318 (1936).
85.
Cf. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §10 at art. II. § 2.
86.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936).
87.
Bilder, at 826.
88.
U.S. CoNsT. art. 11,§2, cl. 2; id. at Art. 1,§8, cl. 2. See also Bilder, at 827-8.
89.
U.S. CONST. art. I, §10. et seq. (ci. 1: bars the state governments from making treaties with
foreign nations, clause three bars states, without Congressional consent, from entering into compacts with
foreign nations).
90.
U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 2 et seq., id. at Art. 1, §8, cl. 2.; See also Bilder, at 829.
91.
Bilder, at 830. This statement can be interpreted one of two ways. If states have any foreign
affairs power, such power must be granted by the political branches of the federal government. However, if
it can be legitimately argued, as presented infra through out this paper, that there exist an absolute exclusion
of state and local government in foreign affairs, a grant to the states of such power creates an interference by
the states into the federal government's ability to negotiate in foreign affairs.
92.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1 (1824); Jennison, 39 U.S. at 570-71.
93.
Jennison, 39 U.S. at 571.
94.
U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
95.
Id. at art. I et seq.
96.
Id. at art. Il et seq.
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entering into agreements with foreign nations.9" Congress has no authority,
under the Constitution, to grant states treating making power.98 Furthermore,
there exist no implied authority by the federal government to allow states to
enter into agreements with foreign nations. 99 Interpreting the text of Constitution, courts have held that the President, along with the executive branch, hold
exclusive power to make treaties and to conduct the foreign affairs of the
United States." Accordingly, the court's definition of a treaty, implies that
only sovereign nations, not sovereign states of nations, can enter into such
agreements.
The structure of the Constitution supports the contention that states do not
possess any powers within the realm of foreign affairs.' 0 ' Although the
Constitution creates a dual sovereignty,' °2 the states have ceded their power to
the federal government in interstate"0 3 and international matters," °4 so that the
country is able to act with a unified voice."0 5 Thus all powers to act in the area
of foreign relations is vested in the federal govemment.'0
Despite the explicit Constitutional language and the structure of the
Constitution, prohibiting treaties between states and foreign nations, early
Supreme Court cases addressed the issue of whether certain state actions
triggered the constitutional prohibitions. 0 7 In Holmes v. Jennison, 1 the Court
addressed the issue whether the Governor of Vermont could assist Canada by
detaining and extraditing Holmes, a Canadian resident, who had committed a

97.
98.

Id. at art. 1,§10, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art 1, §10, cl. 1. See also Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 725,735

(1838).
99.
Sloan v. Baker, 10 P.2d 362, 363 (Or. 1932). Although the Constitution provides that states,
with the consent of Congress, can enter into agreements with foreign nations, U.S. CONST, art. 1, §10, cl. 3,

the courts have narrowly interpreted the Compact Clause. The courts have frowned upon the states' ability
to maintain continuous relations with foreign nations because such agreements would interfere with the
supremacy of the federal government. See discussion infraregarding the courts' interpretation ofthe Compact
Clause.
100. See U.S. v. Hooker, 607 F.2d 286,289 (9th Cir. 1979); see generally First National City Bank
v. Banco National de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 761 (1972).
101. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 570.
102.

Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71,76 (1869); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,457 (1991);

Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).

103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: Commerce Clause.
104. U.S. CONsr. art. I, §10, cl. 1 (absolutely prohibiting the states to enter into treaties with foreign
nations); id. at art. 1, §10, cl. 3 (requiring states to obtain Congressional consent to enter into compacts with
foreign countries).
105. In re Hansen's Estate, 281 N.Y.S. 617,620-621 (N.Y. Sur. 1935); see also Zschemig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
106. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 570.
107. Id.; Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
108. 39 U.S. 540 (1840).
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crime in Canada and had escaped to Vermont." °9 The Court found that by
extraditing Holmes from Vermont to Canada, the governor was neither
protecting his citizens nor exercising a valid police power."' The court stated
that Vermont, by assisting Canada under the principles of comity of nations,
intruded upon the domain of the federal government's foreign affairs powers."'
Thus, the Court held that the agreement between Vermont and Canada was
prohibited within the context of the federal government's control over foreign
affairs, and therefore unconstitutional." 2 Although this case was decided prior
to the enactment of any federal statutes or treaties relating to extradition, it
elucidates the premise that the authority to interact with foreign nations is
vested in the federal government, and not the states.
In Sloan v. Baker,"3 the Mayor of Portland visited Europe in order to
establish diplomatic contacts with European municipalities. The Supreme
Court of Oregon opined that cities do no possess any characteristics of a
sovereign and thus can not aggrandize themselves with authority not given to
them."14 The court, citing the federal Constitution's prohibition of state
governments in establishing relations with foreign nations," 5 declared that
neither an expressed nor an implied authority existed "on the part of a
municipality of a state to assume ambassadorial relations either with municipalities of other states or with foreign governments." ' ' 6 Therefore, states do not
possess any foreign affairs powers." 7
109. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 568.
110. Id. at 568, 569.
111. Id. at 569; Comity is not a discretion afforded the state courts, but one possessed by the nationstates. Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 589 (1839). Because comity is discretionary, it is not obligatory, and a
nation-state can choose not to exercise their discretion. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166 (1895).
112. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 568.
113. IOP.2d 362(1932). In Sloan v. Baker, the issue on appeal was whether the Mayor of Portland,
Oregon, was entitled to payment of his salary for the sixty days that we was in Europe, and not in Portland.
Id. at 363. Although this case is on the state court level, it exemplifies the doctrine of foreign relations
preemption, the doctrine that neither a city nor a state has a mandate to exercise authority in the field of
foreign affairs, a power directly vested in the federal government by the Constitution. See generally Koh,
at 1824. But see Bilder, at 821, which argues that although the foreign affairs power is vested in the federal
government, various states and municipalities have initiated relations with foreign nations and it is up to
"Congress and the President to decide whether to preempt it." Id. at 830.
114. Sloan, 10 P.2d at 364.
115. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §10.
116. Sloan, 10 P.2d at 364.
117. In practice, the states prohibition into the realm of foreign affairs is not considered absolute.
In Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), the Supreme Court held that test was whether the intrusion by the
states had "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries." Id. at 517. In Clark, the court declared
valid on its face a California probate reciprocity statute, which excluded non-resident alien legatees from
taking a decedent's property, by either testamentary disposition or intestate succession, unless, similar
procedures existed to afford United States citizens the same benefit in the foreign nation.
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The Supreme Court's stance on the Doctrine of Dormant Foreign Relations
Preemption is represented in Zschernig v. Miller. "' In Zschemig, the court held
that Oregon's "Iron Curtain" statute was "an intrusion by the state into the field
of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the
Congress."" 9 The statute at issue allowed for property, which would have
vested in German nationals by intestate succession, to escheat to the state
before vesting unless the foreign nationals could prove, inter alia, that there
existed a reciprocal right of inheritance in Germany. 20 Justice Douglas stated
that although states traditionally regulated intestate succession, if the state
legislature "impair[s] the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy"''
22
it must be invalidated.
In comparison, the ICSE provisions authorize states to enter agreements
with foreign nations. 123 Yet, the Constitution bars the states from enter into
treaties with foreign nations. 24 Furthermore, foreign relations power is directly
However, twenty years later, the Supreme Court's decision in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)
again established that any intrusion, regardless how indirect or incidental, by the state government in foreign
affairs, have a direct effect on the federal government's ability to effectively administer their foreign relations
power. Id. at 436. Justice Douglas enunciated that although matters of property is a area of law traditionally
reserved to the states by the tenth amendment, international property law is a matter for the Federal
government, not the state probate courts to decide. Id. at 438. See also J. Stewart's concurrence stating the
same premise. Id. at 443.
118. 389 U.S. 249 (1968). See also Koh, at 1847; Bilder, at 824-25.
119. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432.
120. Id. at 431.
121. ld. at 440.
122. Id. Justice Stewart, in concurrence, articulated that allowing states to act in matters of foreign
affairs would be an invasion by the state where the Constitution only permitted the federal government to
trespass. Id. at 442.
In contrast, Justice Harlan, concurring for other reasons, id. at 681-82, asserted that Oregon's "Iron
Curtain" statute was not unconstitutional on its face and interprets the Court's decision as a call to find the
statute unconstitutional when applied. Id. at 459. Harlan oversimplifies the majority's opinion when he
stated that the opinion rests on the premise that the statute's requirement of reciprocity and the fact that a
foreign heir could inherit Oregon property would "involve the state courts in evaluation of foreign laws and
governmental policies, and that this is likely to result in offense to foreign government." Id. at 459-60. Prior
to any state court exercising their discretion, the statute's requirement of reciprocity frustrates the federal
government's ability to negotiate with another country, in this case Germany, on matters of recognition of
legatee rights.
Second, Harlan contends that the statute would not cause significant interference in foreign relations
since the Court did not mention, nor did the record show that "any instance in which such an occurrence has
been the occasion for a diplomatic protest, or, indeed, has had any foreign relations consequence whatsoever."
Id. at 460. Harlan cites the fact that the government did not contend that the Oregon statute would interfere
with the federal government's foreign relations. Id. Additionally, Harlan looks to the fact that the State
Department has stated that such a State statute would have a minute effect on foreign relations and foreign
policy. Id.
123. 42 U.S.C.A. §659a (d) (West. 1998).
124. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§10.
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given to the executive branch for general purposes,' 25 and the legislative branch
for economic purposes.' 26 Nor do state governments possess a right of passage
into foreign affairs within their residual constitutional grant of power.'2 7
Although states are sovereignties, similar to the decision in Sloan, states can not
aggrandize themselves with authority implicitly denied to them by the federal
Constitution. 128 In early cases, such as Holmes, and later cases, such as
Zschernig, the Supreme Court has articulated that the Framers did not intend
for the states to have a foreign affairs power.'2 9 Additionally, there exist no
aperture within the Constitution's state prohibition clauses to imply that states
even have a residual authority to enter into agreements with foreign nations. 130
Comparatively, the ICSE provisions creation of a grant of power to the state
government to negotiate child support agreements with foreign nations goes
against the Constitutional text and the framer's intent of what constituted
proper realms of state authority.
"No power under the [federal] government can make [any treaty entered
into by a state] valid or dispense with the constitutional prohibition.' 3 t The
Court's interpretation of the constitutional limitations on state governments in
Holmes and Zschernig, in addition to the similar treatment by a state supreme
court in Sloan, illustrates that state governments can neither circumvent the
limitations nor initiate agreements which would create an interference into
United States foreign affairs. 3 2
B.

Compact Clause

A second issue which arises from the enactment of the ICSE provisions is
whether the arrangements by the states with foreign nations goes so far beyond
the scope of the Constitution's Compact Clause as to actually interfere with the
nature of the federal structure of government. The current arrangements t3 3
125. Id. art. Het seq; id. at art. 11,§ 2, cl. 2.
126. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations").
127. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
128. States can provide, within state constitutions, more protection to its citizens than are given to
United States citizens within the federal constitution. Yet, states can not afford themselves more authority
which is not enumerated within the federal constitution.
129. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 569.; See also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (explaining
that comity of nations can only exist between a federal government towards another nation's federal
government, and is not a state court between a foreign nation.) Id. at 163-66; Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 589
(1839) ("it is not the comity of the courts, but the comity of the nation.").
130. Cf U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cls. 1, 3 with id. at amend. X.
131. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 724-725 (1838).
132. Id.
133. The Supreme Court in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893), defines the terms
"compact" and "agreement." The term compact usually applies to formalistic contractual arrangements, while
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between states and foreign nations regarding international child support
enforcement are parallel unilateral policy declarations, for example, agreements.' a4 The ICSE provisions represent congressional consent of these
agreements. Yet, the contention lies in nature of these agreements as being
beyond the framers' intent as permissible compacts, regardless of congressional
consent.
The form of an agreement does not dictate whether it is a compact. The
13 5
question rests on the impact of the arrangement on the federal government.
The general test regarding what constitutes a compact between two sovereign
entities 3 6 and whether it needs congressional consent was established at the
close of the nineteenth century in Virginia v. Tennessee,'37 which was
substantially modified in UnitedStates Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission."' The standard of review as to whether a compact falls under the
Compact Clause of the constitution is (1) whether the agreement has an impact
on the federal structure,'3 9 and (2) whether the agreement tends to increase the
political power of the state or interfere with areas of governance whose subject
matters are under the exclusive control of the federal government. "
The first inquiry is whether the agreement has an impact on the federal
structure.' 4' Not every agreement between two or more states is a "compact"
requiring congressional consent. 42 Agreements that are solely concerned with
intrastate affairs or the health and safety of the state citizens 14 1 would not pierce
the federal government's domain. Few cases address the issue of a state
entering into an agreement with a foreign nation.'" One early Supreme Court
case which interprets the Compact Clause's application to such arrangements
is Barron v. Baltimore. 45 In that case, Barron, the owner of a wharf in
agreements refer to all stipulations between the two affected parties. Id. In this paper, I use the terms
interchangeably, as the court has designated them to be used.
134. Gloria F. DeHart, Getting Over There, 9 FAM. ADVOC. 34 (1987) [hereinafter DeHart].
135. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363,369 (1976); Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at47071; see also Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,440 (1981).
136. Sovereign entities can be either states or foreign nations.
137. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
138. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 452.
139. Id. at 471.
140. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 518.
141. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 471.
142. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 518. The Supreme Court lists illustrations of agreements between states
where congressional consent would not be required to validate the agreement. Id. In addition, the court opines
that "the terms 'compact' or 'agreement' in the Constitution do not apply to every possible compact or
agreement between one state and another." Id.
143. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 518. (noting various intrastate concerns which do not interfere with the
federal structure).
144. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 569.
145. 32 U.S. at 243.
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Baltimore's eastern harbor sued the city of Baltimore for damages caused when
the city diverted waterways, which interfered with the operation of the docks. "
In dicta, Justice Marshall asserted that the Constitution expressly placed limits
on the state government in certain subject matters, as listed in Article I, Section
10 of the Constitution.147 He elucidated the issue regarding a state's ability to
compact with foreign countries by declaring that such arrangements interfere
48
with the exclusive power of the federal government to enter into treaties.
Yet, Marshal acknowledged that compacts amongst the several states do not
conflict with the framers' intent and purpose for the clause.1 49 The premise of
Marshall's stance lies in the fact that if a state government acted, on the local
level, in the making of arrangements with foreign nations, then such action
would interfere with the federal government's authority of coordinating efforts,
on a national level, for the common good of all citizens. 5 ' Since the limitation
are expressively stated in the Constitution, the court found there was no room
for interpretation as to any other meaning.
Thus, the court stated that there
did not exist any convincing evidence to ignore the expressed limits the
Constitution has placed on the state legislature.'
Similarly, in Virginia v. Tennessee,'53 Virginia wanted the court to set
aside a compact entered into by Virginia and Tennessee to establish their
respective borders for lack of congressional consent. 54 The case dealt with
determining what types of compacts need congressional consent. 55 Justice
Field, citing Justice Story, 5 6 expressed that where treaties are political in
nature, compacts apply to subjects which "might be deemed mere private rights
of sovereignty."' 57 Furthermore, just as Congress can give consent to validate
a compact, Congress can also bar states from entering into compacts.' 58 Certain
146. See id. The issue centered around whether the actions of the municipality constituted a taking
under the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. Although, The case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, the court did address the issue of the application of the Compact Clause to state agreements with
foreign nations. Id. at 249, 251.
147. See id.at 249. The purpose of Article 1,§ 10 of the Constitution was to"restrain state legislation
on subjects entrusted to the government of the union, in which the citizens of all the states are interested."

id.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Barron, 32 U.S. at 249.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Virginia, 148 U.S. at 503.
Id. at517.
See id. at518-519.
J. STORY, COMMENTARIESONTHECONSTITUTION OFTHE UNrIED STATES § 1403 (R. Rotunda

& J. Nowak eds. 1987).

157.
158.

Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519.
Id. at519-520.
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subject matters belong to the federal government as a general right of federal
sovereignty. 5 9 In addition, these rights also belong to the state governments,
unless the right has been ceded to the federal government by the federal
constitution. 60
If the scope of the Compact Clause encompasses those agreements which
tend to increase the political power of the states, thus "encroach[ing] upon or
interfere[ing] with the just supremacy of the United States,"' 16' then agreements
regarding the enforcement of international child support would fall under the
clause. Even if the ICSE provisions operate as congressional consent, the
legislative history of the ICSE provisions acknowledges the fact that states do
not have the power to enter into treaties.' 62 Likewise, the United States
Constitution prohibits states from entering into any treaty, ,63and requires states
to gain congressional consent to enter into any agreement or compact with
another state or foreign power.'"
The permissive language within the ICSE provision would imply that the
statute's intent is to consent to the agreements between states and foreign
nations regarding international child support enforcement.' 65 If the ICSE
provision constitutes congressional consent, the provision would make any
arrangements made by a state with a foreign nation a matter of federal law." 667
Similarly, provisions of a treaty have equal footing with acts of Congress.'
When a federal law and a provision of the United States Constitution, in this
case the Compact Clause, are in conflict with one another, the Constitution, as
the supreme law of the land will always prevail.' 68 Therefore, the ICSE
provision as federal law can not permit states to enter into agreements with
foreign nations. The courts in Barron and Virginiaexpressed that the framers'

159. Id. at 525.
160. Id.
161. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,440 (1981); Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 485 (White,
J., dissenting); See also McHenry v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540, 544 (N.D. 1917).
162. H.R. REP. No. 104-430, at 44 (1995); H.R. REP. No. 104-350, at 44 (1995); Pub. L.
No. 104193, § 39, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); 141 CONG. REC. H 15317-01, H 15427 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. H! 2509-01
(Pt. 2), H12976 (1995); See also U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 10, cl.1.
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.I (state treaty prohibiting clause).
164. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 10, cl.
3 (compact clause).
165. 42 U.S.C.A. § 659a(d) (West 1998). "States may enter into reciprocal arrangements for the
establishment and enforcement of support obligations with foreign countries that are not the subject of a
declaration [by the State Department], to the extent consistent with Federal law." Id.
166. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at439 n. 7. Under the "Law of the Union" Doctrine, if an interstate agreement
has congressional approval it becomes federal law. See also Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v.
Colburn, 310 U.S. 419,427-28 (1940); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13. How.)
518, 566 (1852).
167. Asakura v. City of Seattle, Washington, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); United States v. The Peggy,
5 U.S. 103 (1801).
168. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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intent did not allow for continuous on-going agreements between the states and
any foreign nations. Such agreements would interfere with the delicate nature
of the federal system of government. Thus, Congress' grant to the states of the
authority to negotiate agreements with foreign nations concerning child support
enforcement goes against the constitutional limitations placed upon and residual
powers vested in the government of the several states.
C.

ForeignCommerce Clause

Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution states that "Congress
shall have the Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with Indian Tribes."' 69 Since 1937, when the
Supreme Court decided NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,170 the court has
broadened its recognition of Congress' plenary powers under the Commerce
Clause. NLRB marked the commencement of a period of extreme judicial
deference to the legislature.' 7' It was not until the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Lopez,'72 that the judiciary began to reevaluate Congress'
assertions of authority under the Commerce Clause.
Although foreign affairs power is vested primarily in the executive branch,
only Congress has the power to regulate foreign commerce.' 7 3 In Hodel v.
VirginiaSurface Mining & ReclamationAss'n, 174the Supreme Court developed
a two-prong test in determining whether Congress has exceeded its authority
under the Commerce Clause. '5To evaluate the constitutionality of Congress'
consent to states to enter into agreements with foreign nations, the Court would
first have to determine whether a rational basis exists to conclude that the

169. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.3.
170. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In NLRB, the court upheld the
National Labor Relations Act against a Commerce Clause challenge. Id. at 36-8. In doing so, the court held
that Congress may regulate intrastate commerce activities which have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce as a prophylactic against burdens on interstate commerce. Id. at 37.
171. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100(1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938). In
Wickard, the application of the Commerce Clause was stretched to its limits. The court, by upholding the
act, permitted Congress to regulate local production and local consumption of wheat by a farmer because the
aggregate effects of taking the wheat out of commercial circulation would substantially effect interstate
commerce.
See also United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1096 (D. R.I. 1996) (noting that "the Supreme
Court had not invalidated a federal statute as exceeding Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause for
over fifty years" until the Lopez decision).
172. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1624.
173. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affd, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
174. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
175. See id. at 276.
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regulated activity substantially effects interstate or foreign commerce.' 716 If a
rational basis exist, the court would then look to see whether the specific
77
regulation is reasonably adapted to the goals permitted by the Constitution.
In Lopez, the Supreme Court established three broad categories of activity
which Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause: (1) the channels of
interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3)
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 178 Chief
Justice Rehnquist declared "that the proper test requires an analysis of whether
the regulated activity 'substantially effects' interstate commerce."' 179 The Lopez
decision has been used as the judicial standard in determining the outer limits
of the Commerce Clause.'
Given the language in the ICSE provisions, test
two and test three seem to address the issue of whether the designation to the
state government of a right to enter into an agreement with a foreign nation is
with in Congress' Commerce Clause power.
Goods which enter into the stream of commerce are immune from state or
local taxation, so long as, the goods remain in the stream of commerce.''
Currently, the federal courts are spilt as to whether payment of child support
orders are considered "goods" and thus can be regulated by Congress under the
Commerce Clause.'8 2 The standard for regulation of commerce is whether the
activity substantially affects interstate commerce.' 83 Any economic activity by
the states which substantially effects or places a direct burden on Congress'
enumerated power to regulate foreign commerce can be regulated by Congress
under the Commerce Clause.18 4
The economic or commercial impact of the activity on interstate commerce
dictates whether Congressional regulation is permissible, not the nature of the

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30.
179. Id. at 1630.
180. See Unites States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076, 1078-79 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (analyzing the
constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act in ight of Lopez); Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 1097-1100
(analyzing the constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act using Lopez's categorical analysis).
181. See Eureka Pipe lne Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921).
182. Compare Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 1096 (asserting that regulation by Congress of interstate child
support payments is a regulation of channels of interstate commerce) with United States v. Parker, 911 F.
Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995), (arguing that Congress lacked the authority to regulate failure to pay child support
orders because unpaid money in such cases did not constitute a "good"). See also United States v.
Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076, 1082 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (noting that the Third Circuit, in United States v.
Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3rd Cir. 1996), defines "commerce" under the Commerce Clause quite expansively).
183. See Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. at 1082.
184. See DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 237 U.S. 34 (1927); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S.
110, 119 (1942); Cuban Steamship v. Fitzpatrick, 66 F. 63 (E.D. La. 1895).
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activity.'85 The majority of the courts hold that regulation of child support
enforcement is a constitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause
power. 86 Payment of child support constitutes commerce because the parent
who does not fulfill his or her obligation to pay receives an economic gain by
withholding such funds, at the same time there exist an economic loss to the
child who does not receive the needed money.' 87 Under the analysis that
Congress has the authority to regulate all channels of interstate commerce,' 88
payment of child support payments is an economic activity which has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Thus by analogy, international child
support payments would have an equivalent effect on foreign commerce.
Therefore, if payment of child support is considered a "good," then any
agreement by the states with a foreign nation could impair a "good" traveling
with in the stream of foreign commerce. Congress has plenary powers over
foreign commerce. Yet, the taxing harm caused by the state agreements with
foreign nations would be left entirely to the whim of state government and its
legiglature.
In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down a federal statute which regulated
the possession of a gun on school property.' 89 After presenting a history of
judicial treatment of the Commerce Clause," g Justice Rehnquist, writing the
opinion for the court, stated that possession of a hand gun on school property
did not constitute an economic activity that might substantially effect interstate
commerce.91 The court noted that the invalid statute lacked two things. First,
the statute failed to provide a jurisdictional element, connecting the regulated
activity with interstate commerce. Second, the statute lacked any mention, in
its text or legislative history, of its substantial impact on interstate commerce. 12
185.

See Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. at 1082; United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 581 (3rd. Cir.

186.

Currently nine district courts and the Second Circuit have upheld a federal statute which

1996).

criminalizes the non-payment of child support as constitutional. Only four district courts have found that the
statute is beyond Congress' Commerce Clause power.
187. See United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84,90 (D. Conn. 1995); Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 1099.
188. See United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Since payment often
occurs by mail, wire, or electronic transfer of funds, these instrumentalities are all included in Congress'
broad definition of interstate commerce. Id.
189. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. See discussion infra p. 1634 (providing a more detail analysis of

the case).
190. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627-30.
191.

See id. at.1634.

192. See id. If these two elements were included, the court could have found that the inclusion was
merely a pretext to validating the law under the Commerce Clause. Yet, the pretext argument is difficult to
prove.
The Lopez case merely adds to the pile of uncertainty regarding what Congress can regulate. Unlike
the historical test of direct or indirect effects on interstate commerce, the substantial effects test acknowledges
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Similar to the statute in Lopez, the ICSE provisions lack the necessary
legislative history to create a nexus between international child support
enforcement and foreign commerce.1 93 It can be asserted that Congress has the
authority to regulate payment of international child support orders t94 However,
what is being challenged is the statute's grant of authority to the state
governments to regulate an activity that has a substantial effect on foreign
commerce. Subsection (d) of the first ICSE provision 95 says that "states may
entered into reciprocal arrangements for the establishment and enforcement of
support obligations with foreign countries."'" Neither the statute nor the
legislative history indicates why granting the states government authority to
enter into such agreements has a diminishing effect on foreign commerce.' 97
The patent effect of subsection (d) is a grant by Congress to the state government to do indirectly what Congress can not do directly, enter into treaties with
foreign nations. 98 The latent effect of subsection (d) is permission given to the
states to regulate foreign commerce. Enforcement of international child support
claims does substantially effect foreign commerce. The abdication of authority
by Congress to the states contradicts the plenary power of Congress to regulate
under the Commerce Clause. Congress can not regulate all aspects of human
life.1 99 Yet, in those areas of activity where Congress can regulate, Congress
should not be able to haphazardly relinquish its authority to the state government if such an action would allow states to set foreign policy and regulate
foreign commerce.
It was not the intention of the framers to give any constitutional recognition to the state government as having a "reserved power" in the area of foreign
commerce. Congress' control over foreign commerce has a tremendous impact
on foreign policy. It can be inferred that any dissemination of this control to the
state government would permit the states and local governments to also
construct United States foreign policy. Congress has a right, under the foreign
Congress' plenary power under the Commerce Clause but at the same time eroding the limits on Congress'
inability to usurp areas of law which have traditionally been under the police power of the states.
193. See discussion following supra notes 44-48.
194. But see United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995), (arguing that Congress lacks
the authority to regulate failure to pay child support orders because unpaid money in such cases did not
constitute a "good").
195. 42 U.S.C.A. § 659a(d) (West 1998).
196. See id.
197. If Congress regulates, they must show that the regulated activity has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. Conversely, if the state regulates, it must show that the effect on interstate commerce
was so minute enough to not require Congressional regulation of the activity. But see Wickard v. Filburn,
were the court upheld a federal regulatory statute because the aggregate effects of the regulated activity had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 317 U.S. at 111.
198. See discussion supra note 197.
199. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
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commerce clause, to regulate international child support enforcement.
However, the statute's appointment to state governments, of an equivalent right
to enter into agreements with foreign nations on the issue of international child
support enforcement, goes against the foreign commerce clause relations to the
state.
III.

UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ: IT'S

EFFECT ON

THE INTERNATIONAL CHILD

SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DEBATE

One of the main purposes of this paper is to elevate the discussion in
whole or in part of the possible invalidity of the ICSE provisions. One way to
go about this mission is to not only present an argument that Congress has the
authority to act but also to assert that Congress lacks the authority to regulate
international child support enforcement. Before United States v. Lopez,
Congress' regulatory power under the Commerce Clause was nearly omnipotent
for over fifty years. During that time period, Congress passed laws dealing with
problems on a national scope, which were morally based and Commerce Clause
authorized. 2' Since Lopez, the Supreme Court's deference to Congress has
waned, replaced instead with a demand that Congress justify its use of the
Commerce Clause to regulate state activity. Utilizing the analysis by the
Supreme Court in Lopez, it can be argued that Congress has no actual or
inherent authority to regulate international child support enforcement claims.
In Lopez, a 12th grader was arrested and charged under the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990,"' for possession of a gun while on school property.
The Supreme Court held that the statute exceeded Congress power under the
Commerce Clause. 2 The court, affirming the Fifth Circuit's decision, declared
the federal statute lacked two key components.2" 3 First, the statute failed to
state whether the regulated activity substantially effected interstate
commerce. 214 In the alternative, if the regulated activity had been an essential
part of a larger regulatory scheme where by without congressional regulation
the scheme would severely burden interstate commerce then the statute may
have been saved.20 5 However, the court concluded that this was not the case.2 "6
The court found that the statute's regulation of gun possession on or near school
200. See Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241-53 (1964) (regulation of inns
and hotels which catered to tourists in order to promote racial integration). See also JILL E. HASDAY,
Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1310 (1998) (examining the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994).
201. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988).
202. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
203. See id. at 1630-1631.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 1631.
206. See id.
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grounds had nothing to do with commerce.2 7 Furthermore, the regulation had
no aggregate effect on interstate commerce. 20 8
In Wickard v. Filburn,209 the court looked to what could be considered the
outer limits of Congress' ability to control interstate commerce to support its
finding. In Wickard, a farmer who had used his land togrow wheat for his
personal consumption was fined for violating the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938.210 The government argued that because the goal of the legislature was
to increase the market price of wheat, the aggregate effects of "home-consumed
wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions. '21'
Even though Filburn's wheat was never sold on the grain market, the court
upheld the federal statute because by growing his own wheat, Filburn would
have no need to buy wheat.212 The aggregate effect of farmers similarly situated
as Filbum would cause demand for wheat to decrease, thus directly effecting
wheat prices.213
International child support claims have a substantial effect on foreign
commerce. Payment or failure to pay international claims effect foreign
commerce. If commerce is intercourse, 211 then an economic activity that effects
international borders is foreign commerce. When a foreign parent pays child
support, it allows for the child to purchase various sustainable items. In
contrast, when a parent does not pay child support, it creates an economic loss
to both the child and the effected economy. Yet, Justice Thomas, in his
concurrence, averred that "the power to regulate 'commerce' can by no
means.., empower the Federal government to regulate marriage... throughout
'
the 50 states."215
Thus, what is still left undecided is whether Congress can
regulate international child support.216
Next, the court expressed that the statute should state a jurisdictional
element demarcating the nexus between interstate commerce and the regulated

207. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
208. See id. at 1631.
209. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
210. Id. at 128.
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. See id. If the farmer grows his own wheat, then he has no need to buy wheat, thus decreasing
the demand for wheat on the open market. When the farmer decides not to sell his wheat but use it for
personal consumption, it results in a decrease in supply of wheat in the open market.
214. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is
something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations and parts of
nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse." Id.
215. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
216. But see id. (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Any interpretation of the Commerce Clause that even
suggests that Congress could regulate such matters is in need of reexamination.").
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activity. In United States v. Bass, 17 such a connection was established. In
Bass, the court upheld a federal statute that criminalized the receiving,
possessing, or transporting of any firearm in commerce or affecting
commerce.2 1 8 "The Court interpreted the possession component of [the statute]
to require an additional nexus to interstate commerce both because the statute
was ambiguous and because 'unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it
will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-balance. '219
Thus, to be successful, the defender of the statute must demonstrate not only
that the regulated activity occurred but also that there exist a nexus between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce. Such expressed jurisdictional
element might limit Congress' reach to a finite set of person or things that have
220
an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.
Courts have looked to the expressed legislative history and committee
221
notes for clarification. Even though legislative findings are not necessary,
they enable the court to interpret the legislative intent of the statute.222 Yet, in
the case of the ICSE provisions such legislative findings are essential because,
similar to the statute in Lopez, the ICSE provisions addresses a never before
promulgated issue. 2' Thus, the "prior federal enactments or Congressional
findings [do not] speak to the subject matter... or its relationship to interstate
commerce." 224 However, the legislative history and the committee notes of the
ICSE provisions do not state the requisite nexus with interstate commerce. The
issue is whether Congress can regulate, with out more, international child
support enforcement.2 5 Under the Bass model, a clear congressional intent
must be shown. 2" In the ICSE provisions it was not.
In Lopez, the court determined that if the government's argument was to
be accepted, it would hamper the court's ability to limit Congress' regulatory
authority of subjects traditionally under the state's police power.22 7 Federal
217. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
218. Id. at 337; see also Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
219. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (quoted in Bass, 404 U.S. at 349).
220. See idt
221. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1997) ("Congress need not make particularized
findings in order to legislate."); Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
222. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
223. Pub. L No. 104-193, § 39, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (indicating that prior to the passage of the
ICSE provisions, no legislation existed on the issue of international child support enforcement).
224. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
225.
226.

See id. at1631.
See Bass, 404 U.S. at 337.

227. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 ("[lIt is difficult to perceive any limitations on federal power,
even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where states historically have been sovereign").
Justice Rehnquist, in his decision for the court, criticizes Justice's Breyer's dissent as lacking limits because
it would allow any activity to be economic in nature and thus under Congress' regulatory control.
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police power does not exist in the Constitution. 22 8 "The Constitution mandates
this uncertainty [of which government controls which subject matters] by
withholding from Congress a plenary police power that would authorize
enactments of every type of legislation."22' 9 Since the ICSE provision deals with
family law, one of the areas under a state's police power, it can be averred that
Congress lacks the requisite power to regulate international child support
enforcement under the Commerce Clause.
IV. CAN THE ICSE PROVISIONS STAND AS AN EFFECTIVE TOOL IN INTERNATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT?

All legislation is presumed constitutional. Yet, "[ilf [Congress] were to
make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be
considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are
to guard.. . They would declare it void."23
A.

The ICSE Provisions Create Legal Quagmires

The Constitution absolutely prohibits states from entering into treaties
with foreign nations.23 ' The significance of such a limitation on state
government was to prevent local interference into foreign affairs. As
mentioned, traditionally the Supreme Court has held that any action by a state
with a foreign nation would invoke this constitutional prohibition.232 Yet,
recently the court had been of two differing positions. First, if the subject
matter has a high probability of becoming a subject of international dispute then
the federal government has paramount authority in and power over the subject
2 " the conflict centered
matter.233 In United States v. California,
around whether
California could control oil reserves located within the boundary of the State's
three mile territorial waters.2 35 The court held that such authority over
petroleum commerce would severely affect the nation's ability to engage in
commerce with other nations and the stability of global peace.2 36 The court

228.

See id. at 1633.

229. See id.
230.

THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 553 (John Marshall); See alsoLopez 115 S.Ct. at 1650 n. 9 (Thomas,

J., concurring).
231. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, ci. 1.
232.

Jennison, 39 U.S. at 540 (holding that New York had no right to capture and relinquish a

fugitive to Canada).
233. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
234.

Id.

235.
236.

See id. at 28-29.
See id.
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ruled that control of the oil reserves was the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government and not that of the California State government.237
On the other hand, the court has found the treaty prohibiting clause did not
prevent a state from regulating its citizens' fishing activity outside the state's
2 39
territorial waters.238 In Skiriotes v. Florida,
the court held that if Florida's
action did not directly conflict with federal legislation, then Florida could
exercise its police power to regulate its citizens' behavior on the high seas.
Comparatively, the agreements by the states do have a potential for
international conflict. Early agreements between states and foreign nations
were not binding on both parties .2' Furthermore, it can be inferred from Gloria
DeHart's article2 41 that the arrangements between the states and the foreign
nations were wrought with problems because of lack of reciprocity on the part
of the state and the inability or unwillingness of foreign courts to enforce state
judgments. 42 Besides Canada, Great Britain no longer recognized an extended
definition of state to include individual states, thus requiring a nation to nation
reciprocity of recognizing of child support orders. 24 3 In West Germany, a semiprivate agency, and not the federal government, 2' established an arrangement
with California regarding enforcement of child support orders. 4 5 Although the
individual states established a de facto reciprocity' 6 system with Germany and
the other nations, the ICSE provision would still require both the reciprocating
nation and the United States to establish reciprocity by governmental declaration.247 The notion of de facto reciprocity presupposes that de jure reciprocity
would be an agreement established by treaty between the initiating country and
the responding country. Despite the fact that within several foreign countries
legislation has been passed to recognize agreements with individual states and
to establish reciprocity with the state, 48 with the United States such legislature,

237. See id. at 29.
238. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
239. Id.
240. See DeHart,supra note 134, at 94 n. 26 (exclaiming that although Canadian courts would enter
a finaljudgement on child support order originating from an American state, the Canadian court still required
from the state government some assurance of reciprocity to be attached to the original order).
241.

Id.

242. Id. at 94-99.
243. Id. at 95 n. 29.
244. Id. at 96. According to DeHart, under German law the German government could not
participate officially. DeHart, supra note 134, at 96.
245. Id. at 97 (describing an agreement between France, New York, and California).
246. Id. at 102 (defining de facto reciprocity as recognition of a foreign other with out the formalities
of a treaty).
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 659a(a).
248. See DeHart, supra note 134, at 98-99.
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as embodied in the ICSE provisions, may not be legally invalid against our
Constitution.
Similar to California,the individual arrangements by the state and the
foreign governments on international child support enforcement lay the
foundation for potential international disputes. Unlike Skiriotes, arrangements
between states and foreign nations do affect the sovereign authority of the
United States to negotiate with other nations on this subject matter. If the
United States had been a signatory to any of the United Nations treaties on the
subject of international child support enforcement, the.states participation and
the ICSE provisions would be considered "necessary and proper" implementation in the enforcement process.2' 9 However, the United States is neither a
signatory to or has never negotiated with any nation in the area of international
child support enforcement. The negotiation by the state governments and the
resultant de facto reciprocity between the state and foreign nations can infer a
treaty like relationship between the two parties.
How the courts have interpreted the Compact Clause creates a second
argument as to why agreements between state and foreign nations run afoul of
the Constitution. Aside from the necessity of Congressional consent, the
original inherent right of states to make compacts was not relinquished under
the Constitution.250 The formation of compacts by states 'was to be equivalent
" ' The significance
to sovereign nations forming treaties. 25
of the distinction
between the treaty prohibiting clause and the compact clause was stated by the
252
Supreme Court in Holmes v. Jennison.
[T]he use of all of these terms, "treaty," "agreement," and "compact"
show that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to
use the broadest and most comprehensive terms; and that they
anxiously desired to cut off all connection or communication between
a State and a foreign power; and we shall fail to execute that evident
intention, unless we give to the word "agreement" its most extended
signification; and so apply it as to prohibit every agreement, written
or verbal, formal or informal, positive or implied, by the mutual
understanding of the parties. 253

249. Under the Federal Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONSr, art. 1, § 8, cl.
18,
federal statutes enacted in accordance with treaties or conventions the United States is signatory to are
considered "necessary and proper" toward the execution of the treaty.
250. Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. 185, 209 (1837).
251. Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104 (1938) ("'The Compact adapts to our Union of
sovereign States the age-old treaty-making power of independent sovereign nations."); Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 37 U. S.at 725.
252. Poole, 39 U.S. at 540.
253. See id. at 570-572.
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Yet, the court later established the test for congressional consent as any
agreement that had a tendency to increase the political power of the state
government or to encroach upon the just supremacy of the United States." 4
Agreements between the states and the foreign nations may not necessarily
increase the political power of the state government, but it does interfere with
the just supremacy of the United States' ability to act in the international
affairs.255 Even if the ICSE provision constituted congressional consent, if
challenged, itis possible to argue that the authority granted to the states is of
such a nature that it would so severely hamper American foreign diplomacy as
to cause conflict of interest between the state government and the federal
government. This conflict of interest between the dual sovereigns, similar to
California,could eventually lead to conflict on an international level. It can be
inferred that agreements between the state and foreign nations should be within
the jurisdiction of the federal government in order to avoid any potential
problems in the international community. Comity is defined as:
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other person who are under the protection of its laws. 6
Comity is not a discretion afforded to state courts, but one possessed by nationstates.25 7 Because comity is discretionary, it is not obligatory, and nation-states
can choose to exercise it at their discretion.2"' Since 1840, when Holmes was
decided, the more recent court decisions regarding comity have referred back
to the Holmes' definition of the nature of the doctrine.259 Comity is more likely
to be considered non-obligatory in nature on the federal court level as seen in
the Holmes2' and limited to the parties who are signatories of the compact, as
in Virginia v. Tennessee.26 ' Under the ICSE provisions, agreements between
the state government and foreign nations places a burden on states that are not
party to the agreement to assist in requests by foreign nations.262 The statute
254. See Virginia, 148 U.S. at 518; Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 452.
255. See Hooker, 607 F.2d at 289 (proclaiming that the state and federal governments have no
precedence of intergovernmental cooperation in international relations and states have no authority to conduct
the international affairs of the United States).
256. See DeHart,supra note 134, at 92; See also Hilton, 159 U.S. at 166. The duty that exists is
an international duty to respond, not a domestic duty.
257. Bank v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 589 (1839).
258. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 166.
259. See id.
260. Holmes, 39 U.S. at 569.
261. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
262. See 42 U.S.C. § 654 32(A).
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specifically states that request "by a foreign reciprocating country... which the
States has an arrangement... shall be treated as a request by a state." '63 Such
a statement can be construed as use of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
implement foreign support orders in non-party states.
From this analysis, the statute can be challenged as creating an obligatory
nature to the principle of comity by forcing the state executive branch to
implement federal policy. 2" In addition, a non-custodial parent can contend
that the statutes require non-contracting states to be party to reciprocal
agreements whose terms they were not able to negotiate.26 Both the doctrine
of comity and recognition of foreign judgments by the courts are discretionary
in nature. If that is the case, then the statute's imposition of a duty on state
courts to accept international foreign judgments goes against the legal premise
of foreign judgments being merely prima facie evidence that a debt exists. The
legal effect of the statute would be to create a recognition and obligation to pay
in states who have adopted the UFMJRA,266 and thus making those states party
to another state's reciprocal agreement with a foreign nation. In total, the
statute creates a lack of accountability in the federal government267 by
impressing upon and creating in the states a duty of care they would not
naturally posses.2 68

B.

The ICSE ProvisionsDelegation of Power to States Should be Challenged

Although an early court case may have stated an absolute concept that
"legislative power can not be delegated," 269 the court has on many occasions
sustained congressional delegation of power to federal agencies.?7 There exists
a de facto recognition by the court of Congress' ability to delegate its authority
in order to resolve specific problems. "Delegation by Congress has long been
263. See id.
264. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 (1997) (finding that Congress has no
authority in forcing state officials to implement federal policy).
265. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. at 748 (stating that states should be made party to any
compact or agreement which effects their territory or citizens).
266. By adopting the UFMJRA, states are not allowed to recognize foreign judgments pertaining to
marital situations.
267. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2382.
268. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982) ("The State has no legitimate interest in
protecting nonresident[s]").
269. See United States. v. Shreveoprt Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932).
270. See, e.g., New York Central Securities Co. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12,25 (1932) (Interstate
Commerce Commission); Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266
(1933) (Federal Radio Commission); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943)
(Federal Communication Commission); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 378 (1989) (Sentencing
Commission).
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recognized as necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not
become a futility. '27' The delicate balance of interpreting the Constitution
either through a functionalist versus formalist viewpoint has diffused the exact
boundary of Congress' ability to delegate authority to such an extent that the
Supreme Court, from early on, has been reluctant to decide on the matter
unnecessarily. 2 The court is more willing to sustain delegations whenever
Congress provided an "intelligible principle" to which the federal agency or
office could conform. 273 Therefore, the Supreme Court has been very
deferential to and recognizes the broad scope of Congress' ability in delegation
of authority to federal agencies.274 Yet, when it comes to foreign affairs and the
delegation of power to the states the court has had a more conservative
approach.275
Congress has promulgated statutes delegating state officials and agencies
to implement and execute federal laws. 276 Although the court expressed doubts
as to Congress' ability to delegate authority to the state governments, it has
been more consistent in ruling that Congress can give the state government the
option to enforce federal law.277 In Selective Draft Law Cases,278 the court
rejected the argument that a federal statute was invalid because it delegated
duties to state officers.279 Currently, the Court has reversed its position and has
held in numerous occasions that state officers, by virtue of not being appointed
by the President, are not federal officers possessed with the inherent power of
executing federal laws.28 °
In Printzv. United States,2 8' local sheriffs sought to enjoin the enforcement
of provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevent Act (hereinafter "Brady
271. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940); See also Minstretta,
488 U.S. at 372.
272. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1,42 (1825).
273. See JW Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (legislative standards
test). Since after the depression, the Supreme Court has never found a permissible Congressional delegation
of power to a federal agency.
274. See, e.g., SCHOENBORD, The DelegationDoctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985).
275. See United States v. Curtis-Wright Corp, 299 U.S. 304,312 (1936) (sustaining ajoint resolution
of Congress prohibiting the sale of weapons to selected countries, upon designation by the President);
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1918). The standard practice has been to interpret narrowly
the delegation so as to avoid constitutional problems. •
276. See WARREN, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 545 (1925).
277. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
278. Selective Draft Cases, 245 U.S. at 389.
279. See id.
280. In Printz, the Brady Gun Bill case, the court denied application of a section of the statute which
delegated to local sheriffs law enforcement branches, in the interim period prior to a federal system being
implemented, to enforce the federal law. 117 S.Ct. at 2383.
281. Id. at 2365.
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Act"). The court, reaffirming New York v. United States, 28 2 found that Congress
28 3
could not compel states to "enact or administer a federal regulatory program."
Provisions in the Brady Act required, inter alia, the chief law enforcement
officer of a state conduct background checks in the interim period between the
inception of the statute and the time the federal government scheme became
operative.284 In finding the interim provisions unconstitutional, the court first
addressed the government's contention that early congressional enactment
supported the validity of the provisions. 285 The court stated that early federal
statutes did not impose an obligation to act on the state governments, instead
the state authorized its courts to consent to the statute, 6 or the states themselves consented to the statute.28 7 In addition, the court looked to the text of the
Constitution 28 8 and concluded that "the early statutes imposing obligations on
state courts [did not] imply a power of Congress to impress the state executive
into its service. ' 289 The court eluded to the fact that the early statutes held no
evidence of an explicit or implicit grant to the federal government to "command
the states' executive power in the absence of a particularized constitutional
authorization.290
Similarly, the ICSE provisions by requesting that state plans for child
support "must . . . provide that any request for services . . . by a foreign
reciprocating country or a foreign country with which the state has an
arrangement described in [the other ICSE provision] shall be treated as a
request by the state. 29 ' The Constitution in its text 292 and by its structure
creates a dual sovereignty, with enumerated powers vested in the federal

282. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1995).
283. Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2383.
284. See id. at 2369.
285. See id.at 2370; See generally Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,723-24 (1986) (explaining that
early congressional legislation provided "'contemporaneous and weighting evidence' of the Constitution's
meaning.").
286. Holgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509, 516-17 (1910) (refusing to address the isse of "whether
the states can be required to enforce [provisions of the Act of March 26, 1790] against the state's consent").
287. Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2370; In Unites States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519-520 (1883), the court
asserted that a federal statute "could not be enforced against the consent of the state." Therefore, any
obligations to comply with the statute must be with the state's consent. Id.
288. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl.2 (Supremacy Clause); U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ I (Full Faith and Credit).
289. Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2371.
290. See id. at 2372.
291. 42 U.S.C.A. § 654 132(A) (West 1998).
292. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1869).

2000]

Ferrette

government on the one hand,293 and imposed limitations upon 29 and residual
power295 vested in the state government on the other.296
More recently, in Condon v. Reno,297 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act was unconstitutional because it was a law which applied only to the states and not to private
298
parties, thus was not a law of general applicability.
ICSE provisions give authority to the executive branch to enter into
reciprocal agreements with foreign nations,299 permits the states to enter into
reciprocal agreements with foreign nations, if the federal government has not,3°°
and requires the states to treat foreign judgments for child support as if they
originated in a sister-state. 30 1 Thus, the effect of the statute creates a delegation
to states the power to enter into agreements with foreign nations.
C.

Suggested Remedies

The ICSE provisions can be saved by placing the issue of international
child support enforcement on a completely federal level without local
interference by the states in the federal government's foreign policy. By doing
this, a true demarcation of authority will be defined in such a way that both
sovereign powers, i.e. the state and federal governments, will not be in conflict
with each other. Furthermore, the ICSE provisions can be saved without losing
the desired effect by removing subsection (d) from §659a and 32 from §654.
These sections, which pertain to the role of the state governments in the
international child support arena, as argued, weaken the statute and provides
targets for non-custodial parents to challenge the statute on constitutional
grounds. By enforcing the provisions and allowing Congress to do indirectly
what it could not do directly, make treaties with foreign nations via the state
government, Congress should consider amending the statute to include clearer
legislative history illustrating what role was intended for both the federal and
state governments. Finally, it is for the judiciary to decide whether to follow
the Lopez precedence by finding a point to re-define that which is federal from
that which is local in order to preserve the balance of federalism. On the other
hand, the court may declare that those areas which are not strictly addressed by
293. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
294. See id. at art. I, § 10.
295. See id. at amend. X.
296. Printz 117 S. Ct. at 2377; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493
U.S. 455, 458 (1990).
297. Cordon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998).
298. Id. at 456.
299. 42 U.S.C.A. § 659a (a) (West 1998).
300. Id.
301. Id. at § 654 32.
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the Constitution, such as international child support enforcement, should be
resolved by the democratic process of the Congressional and/or state legisla30 2
ture.
VI. CONCLUSION

As this analysis suggests, there exists sound constitutional grounds for a
non-custodial parent to challenge the international child support provisions.
Although federal legislature, by passing the ICSE provisions, has decided to
assume a more active role in this area, they did not proceed far enough to
safeguard against dismissal of claims purely on procedural grounds. If the court
is expected to interpret and defer to acts of legislation, those acts should
conform to the legislative intent while following the proper course of legal
precedence.
The ICSE provisions reflect the federal government's enterprise in
imposing extra-constitutional power upon the state governments; thus, creating
an incongruity between the articulated purposes of the law and the actual
content of the law itself. Furthermore, under various constitutional clauses,
Congress lacks the power to delegate to states a right to enter into agreements
with foreign nations. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez," 3
Congress has no power under the Commerce Clause to regulate family law.
The content and statutory history of the ICSE provisions do not demonstrate
that regulation of international child support claims substantially effect foreign
commerce. Additionally, the provisions do not contain ajurisdictional element
linking regulation of international child support with foreign commerce.
By granting a right to the state government to enter into agreements with
foreign nations, the legislature has created a federalism problem, obscured the
delicate balance between the federal and state government, and introduced
ambiguity to the process of child support enforcement. By exercising control
over family law, the legislature obfuscated the Supreme Court's decision in
Lopez, avoiding to conservatively interpret the decision, which could have
eliminated any challenge presented by unwarranted congressional abrogation
of the Commerce Clause.

302. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, Justice, Legitimacy andAllegiance:The EndofDemocracy?,44 LOY.
L. REv. 103, 105 (1998). Justice Scalia articulated this very premise in his concurrence in Webster v.
Reproduction Health Services, 492 U.S. 490,523-37 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring). Justice Scalia stated that
on the issue of abortion the federal government could be neither pro-life or pro-choice since abortion, like
many other things, is political in nature and not a constitutional issue. Id.
303. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624.

